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Abstract:  Does an expansion of the population size expose nation 
states to a higher risk of suffering from civil conflict?  Obtaining 
empirical evidence for a causal relationship is difficult due to 
reverse effects and omitted variable bias.  This paper addresses 
causality issues by using randomly occurring drought as an 
instrumental variable to generate exogenous variation in population 
size for a panel of 37 Sub-Saharan countries over the period 1981-
2004.  Instrumental variable estimates yield that a one percentage 
point increase in population size raises the risk of civil conflict by 
over 5.2 percentage points. 
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Abstract: La estimación del impacto del tamaño de la populación 
sobre la probabilidad de conflicto civil se complica por el sesgo de 
endogeneidad y las variables omitidas. Este artículo trata el 
problema de causalidad utilizando métodos de variables 
instrumentales en un panel de 37 países del África Sub-sahariana en 
el período 1981-2004. Encontramos que un aumento de la población 
en un 1% aumenta la probabilidad de conflicto civil por un 5.2%. 
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"The prodigious waste of human life occasioned by this perpetual struggle for room 
and food was more than supplied by the mighty power of population. ...An Alaric, an 
Attila, or a Zingis Khan, and the chiefs around them, might fight for glory, for the fame 
of extensive conquests...but the true cause was a scarcity of food, a population extended 
beyond the means of supporting it."  Thomas R. Malthus (1798) in: An Essay on the 
Principal of Population (p. 23) 
 
1. Introduction 
At least since Malthus (1798) it has been argued that a larger population size increases a country's 
likelihood of suffering from civil conflict.  The immense humanitarian and economic costs 
associated with civil conflicts are now well recognized (e.g. World Bank, 2003; Copenhagen 
Consensus, 2004).  Fearon and Laitin (2003) estimate that since the end of World War II civil 
conflicts have caused more than 16.2 million battle casualties.  Many more people have been killed 
or disabled in civil conflict as a result of strategic violence against the civilian population and the 
spread of lethal diseases (Ghobarah, Huth and Russeth, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2007).  
Highly concerning is also evidence by Bellow and Miguel (2006) that shows that the negative 
impact of civil conflict on economic development may have long-run effects, translating into 
permanently lower levels of per capita GDP.  The Malthusian claim thus bears substantial 
implications for public policy and theories of economic development as it raises concern that 
population increases may not only have a potentially negative effect on per capita income levels but 
also on aggregate output and social and political stability.   
 Obtaining a clean estimate on the impact that population size exhibits on civil conflict risk is 
not an easy task.  In particular, it is very difficult to establish a causal relationship.  The majority of 
empirical studies investigating the link between population size and civil conflict has relied on the 
analysis of panel data, exploiting both cross-country as well as within country time series variation 
(Gleditsch and Urdal, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Urdal, 2005; 
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Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).  It is questionable though to what extend this research has achieved 
testing for a causal relationship as the employed econometric framework does not address large 
biases that arise from reverse causality and omitted variables (e.g. Blattman and Miguel, 2008).  
The mass killing associated with civil conflicts and the waves of migration streams that often set in 
even before warfare activity has fully escalated make (past) population size a highly endogenous 
regressor to the presence of civil conflict (Davenport, Moore, and Poe, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2007; UNHCR, 2007).  Many difficult to measure variables proxying for social 
fragmentation, institutional quality, and economic conditions further complicate inference, pushing 
total biases in arbitrary directions.   
 This paper digs into the question of a causal effect going from larger population size to a 
higher probability of civil conflict by constructing instrumental variable estimates for a panel of 37 
Sub-Saharan countries over the period 1981-2004.  Sub-Saharan Africa has been, and continues to 
be (e.g. World Bank, 2003), one of the world's top concerns in terms of intra-state instability as 
more than two-thirds of the Sub-Saharan countries have suffered from a civil conflict in the past 25 
years.  To generate for these countries variations in population size, I use randomly occurring 
drought as an instrumental variable.  The negative response of the Sub-Saharan population to 
drought provides a unique opportunity to obtain an exogenous source of variation in population size 
both for the cross-section of Sub-Saharan countries as well as within countries across time.  I show 
that once biases are accounted for, population size has a quantitatively large and statistically 
significant effect on African civil conflict. 
 The foundation for my instrumental variable analysis is that Sub-Saharan economies depend 
heavily on a poorly irrigated agricultural sector with crop yield highly vulnerable to rainfall (e.g., 
IPCC, 2001; WDI, 2007).  A combination of government subsidies and unemployment insurances 
cushion the adverse effects of drought in economically developed countries, but these buffer 
mechanisms are either widely lacking in Sub-Saharan countries, or if present highly ineffective 
(Sen, 1981; Fafchamps, 2003).  The impact of drought on poor, credit-constrained, African 
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households is thus much more dramatic.  So much so, that famines caused by extremely harsh and 
repeated drought go hand in hand with a reduction in birth rates, widespread migration, and higher 
mortality rates (WHO, 2006; UNHCR, 2007).  
 A first stage regression supports this identification strategy: Sub-Saharan population size 
decreased in response to drought by an average of 1.6 percentage points, significant at the 1% level.  
In the second stage, I exploit this relationship to construct instrumental variable estimates linking 
exogenously driven variations in country population size to civil conflict.  I find that a one 
percentage point increase in the population of Sub-Saharan countries raises civil conflict incidence 
by over 6.6 percentage points and increases the risk of a new or recurrent civil conflict onset by 
over 5.2 percentage points.  Instrumental variable estimates therefore point towards population size 
having a quantitatively large effect on civil conflict risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
   An important part to my instrumental variable analysis is that I estimate the impact that 
population size exhibits on civil conflict likelihood conditional on per capita GDP.  Since extremely 
low rainfall not only reduces population size, but also total output, the validity of drought as an 
instrumental variable would not be guaranteed without controlling in the second stage for per capita 
GDP.  Per capita GDP is highly endogenous to both civil conflict and population size and I address 
this issue by building on prior work of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) and Brückner and 
Ciccone (2007), using smooth variations in rainfall and plausibly exogenous variation in 
international commodity prices as additional instrumental variables.  More rainfall and higher prices 
for exported commodities significantly increase real per capita income of African countries, but 
have no significant effect on population size.   
 My empirical analysis also takes into account unobservables related to both civil conflict 
and population size.  Country fixed effects are implemented to capture difficult to measure cross-
country heterogeneity such as differences in institutional quality, ethnic and religious 
fragmentation, or time-invariant geographic conditions, such as mountainous terrain.  Additional 
heterogeneity arising from trends in population size or global climate change is addressed by 
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considering the use of country specific time trends and year fixed effects. 
 The paper's findings may be specific to the Sub-Saharan region, but this does not prevent 
them from shedding new and relevant empirical insights on a theoretical debate of general interest 
related to an optimal design of the size of nations (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, 2003, 2005, 
2006).  The adverse effects of civil conflict on economic development and social stability are a 
strong channel through which smaller country size could yield substantial improvements to human 
welfare.  The strength of this paper is that by using an instrumental variable approach it takes a step 
forward to make it credible that the link between population size and civil conflict is of causal 
nature.  In contrast, an analysis based on simple correlations can not shed insight on this debate as it 
is silent about the direction of causality.  
 The remainder is organized as: Section 2 provides a review of the related literature, Section 
3 discusses the estimation methodology, Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 presents the main 
results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Population-Conflict Nexus: Some Theory and Evidence  
The hypothesis that a larger population size can act as a destabilizing force to poor countries' 
political and social order can be traced back at least to Thomas Robert Malthus (1798) who argued 
that population increases lead to a reduction in per capita output of agricultural goods due to a fixed 
supply of (fertile) land.  The human body needs a minimum amount of calories intake in order to 
survive so population expansions around the proximity of subsistence income levels may be 
perceived as a threat to survival.  Malthus (1798, pg. 22) claimed that in the midst of such 
population induced resource scarcity a "struggle for existence" arises with "young scions [being] 
pushed out from the parent-stock to gain happier seats for themselves by their swords". 
 Malthus's thoughts immediately ignited a fierce debate in the circles of policy makers 
concerning the necessity of population control and the benefits derived from government lead 
poverty relief programs (Hart, 1992).  They had also a substantial impact on a broad spectrum of 
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scientists ranging from evolutionary biologists such as Charles Darwin to economists like John 
Meynard Keynes.  It was not however until the end of the 20th century that a systematic effort was 
made to study the connection between population and organized forms of intra-state violence in an 
empirically rigorous manner.   
 Exceptionally rich case study evidence was provided by Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994, 
1999), linking population expansions in the presence of resource scarcity to forms of civil strifes 
that occurred in the Eastern Islands, the Senegal river valley, southern parts of the Philippines, or 
the Assam region in India.  Perhaps the most striking of these examples is the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, where over half a million Tutsi were slaughtered by Hutu militias.  Though a popular 
explanation of the Rwandan genocide has been ethnic hatred between two very polarized groups, 
Homer-Dixon points out that Rwanda was at the time of the conflict one of the most densely 
populated countries in the world.  Moreover, fertile land was in extremely short supply due to a 
consistent degradation of the environment, making food an extremely scarce good.  Interviews of 
Rwandan war casualties collected by Andre and Platteau (1998) echo Homer-Dixon's argument that 
overpopulation and scarcity played a major role in causing the Rwandan genocide.  Andre and 
Platteau report: "The 1994 events provided a unique opportunity to settle scores, or to reshuffle land 
properties, even among [326] Hutu villagers....It is not rare, even today, to hear Rwandans argue 
that a war is necessary to wipe out an excess of population and to bring numbers into line with the 
available land resources."1   
 Although these case studies revealed important and detailed insights on the mechanism of 
population pressure induced civil conflict, they were heavily criticized for suffering from selectivity 
bias and lack of generality (Gleditsch, 2001; Urdal, 2005).  In particular, it was argued that one 
could readily find counter examples where larger population size did not lead to conflict.  
 Two prominent studies by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) that 
used panel data analysis found however also evidence pointing towards countries with larger 
                                                 
1 Quoted from Diamond (2005, Ch. 10) 
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population size to be exposed to a higher risk of intra-state conflict.  To motivate their finding 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argued that the causes of civil conflict can be best understood by 
modeling civil conflict as a "business activity".  Both rebel and government forces need finance in 
order function and soldiers to fight in their armies.  A larger population size, which is associated 
with a greater diversity in preferences, will then provide both camps with a larger pool from which 
to draw potential recruits.  Moreover, these recruits can be hired at a cheaper rate due to supply 
effects.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) on the other hand argued that a larger population size leads to a 
debilitation in the power of the central government in terms of keeping the "taps" on local activity.    
 Many other empirical panel-data studies followed, finding a similarly adverse impact of 
population on civil conflict likelihood (e.g. Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).  But as Blattman and 
Miguel (2008) emphasize, there is no reason to belief yet that there exists a causal relationship 
between civil conflict and country population size as these studies do not address biases arising 
from omitted variables and the endogenous response of population size to civil conflict.  
 
3. Estimation Methodology 
The econometric framework employed in this paper to overcome these problems follows a two-
stage instrumental variable approach that treats both population size and per capita GDP as 
endogenous variables to the incidence and onset of civil conflict.  In a first stage regression country 
population size and per capita GDP are regressed on a set of instruments and control variables.  
Equations (1a) and (1b) show formally the functional specification, 
(1a) log(POPc,t ) = α1,c + β1,c*t +γ1,t + θ1,1 Droughtc,t + θ1,2 log(Rainc,t) + θ1,3 log(Indexc,t) + ε1,c,t     
(1b) log(GDPc,t ) = α2,c + β2,c*t +γ2,t + θ2,1 Droughtc,t + θ2,2 log(Rainc,t) + θ2,3 log(Indexc,t) + ε2,c,t                    
where POP stands for country population size, GDP is the level of (real) per capita GDP, Drought 
is a  dummy variable indicating episodes of drought, Rain is the amount of rainfall observed in a 
given country-year, and Index is an index of international prices for exported commodity goods (see 
Section 3 for a description of these variables).  The control variables are: (i) country fixed effects 
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αc, (ii) country specific time trends βc*t, and (iii) year fixed effects γt.  The first sub-indice "1" refers 
to equation number "1" while the second sub-index identifies the coefficient on the regressor; log 
stands for the natural logarithm.  
 The second stage estimates the impact that variations in population size and per capita GDP 
exhibit on civil conflict.  Formally, it is represented by equation (2), 
(2) Conflictc,t  = α3,c + β3,c*t +γ3,t + θ3,1 Droughtc,t + θ3,2 log(Rainc,t) + θ3,3 log(Indexc,t) + ε3,c,t             
where Conflict is an indicator function that is one in the event of civil conflict and zero else.  Note, 
that despite the presence of a binary dependent variable equation (2) is specified as a linear 
probability model as this is in two-stage instrumental variable estimation the usually preferred 
method (Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Wooldridge, 2003).2 
 
4. Data and Measurement  
I obtain data on civil conflict from the 2007 Armed Conflict Dataset of the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO).  The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database defines civil conflict as a 
"contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle deaths."  According to UCDP/PRIO, a conflict over government is an "incompatibility 
concerning the type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of 
its composition;" a conflict over territory is an "incompatibility concerning the status of the 
specified territory, e.g. secession or autonomy."  Roughly speaking, for every 2 civil conflict 
outbreaks over territorial autonomy, there were about 3.5 civil conflict outbreaks over government.  
For detailed summary statistics see Table 1, Panel A.   
 Data on population size and real per capita GDP is taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2 
                                                 
2 Note also that population and per capita GDP are introduced in the second stage explicitly in levels, rather than 
growth rates.  This guarantees that all possible information contained in the levels of these variables is exploited for 
specific country-years.  Moreover, a level specification is immune to producing potentially confounding effects 
associated with a corresponding growth specification that arise due to rapid reversion of rainfall to its mean (see 
here Ciccone, 2008).   
 10
(Heston et al., 2006).  More specific measures of population size  -- working age population (ages 
15-64), youth bulges (ages 0-14), and male population -- come from the World Development 
Indicators (2007).  The summary statistics for these variables (in log points) can be found in Table 
1, Panel B.   
 Following Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) observations on rainfall for the Sub-
Saharan region come from the NASA Global Precipitation Climatology Project, Version 2 (Adler et 
al, 2003).  Based on this data, droughts are identified by an indicator function that is one for the 5% 
largest negative drops in the level of rainfall over two consecutive years.  Drawing on data provided 
by the Universite Catholique de Louvain's EM-DAT (2008) natural disaster database, Appendix 
Table I shows that these rainfall identified droughts affected in nearly all cases at least hundreds of 
thousands of people, and in many instances the numbers were even in the millions.   
 The index of international commodity prices is taken from Brückner and Ciccone (2007) 
who construct this measure for 19 commodities using fixed export shares.  The fixed export shares 
ensure that the instrument's time-series variation stems entirely from fluctuations contained in 
international commodity prices, which are plausibly exogenous to the incidence of African civil 
conflict.  For summary statistics on rainfall, drought, and the commodity price index see Table 1, 
Panel C.  
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Drought, Population Size, and Per Capita GDP 
The first stage estimates are reported in Table 2, where control variables are country fixed effects, 
country specific time trends, and common year fixed effects (all jointly significant at the 1 percent 
level).  Column (1) shows that drought lead to an average decrease in the total population size by 
over 1.6 percentage points, significant at the 1 percent level.  Minor changes in the level of rainfall, 
as captured by the linear rainfall term, had no significant effect.  The international commodity price 
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index is also insignificant.  Columns (2) and (3) investigate whether this relationship is maintained 
when restricting attention to working age population or youth bulges.  This yields virtually the same 
point estimates as in column (1) with the drought dummy being highly significantly negative.  
Column (4) shows that drought had also an equally significantly negative effect on male population.  
 In column (5), I examine whether one of the reasons why country population size decreased 
in response to drought was because drought increased the incentives for migration to other countries 
(e.g. Sen, 1981; Fafchamps, 2003).  Drawing on annual data made publicly available by the United 
Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) from 1991 onwards, I find that this was 
indeed the case -- drought  increased the number of refugees in the country of origin by over 80 
percent, significant at the 94 percent confidence level.  Smooth variations in rainfall and 
international commodity prices are on the other hand insignificant.   
 In column (6), I report first stage estimates for per capita GDP.  Similar to Miguel, 
Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), I find a positive effect of rainfall on income: a ten percentage point 
increase in the amount of rainfall is associated with an average increase in per capita GDP by 0.75 
percentage points, significant at the 2 percent level.  Also, windfalls from commodity prices were a 
blessing for Sub-Saharan countries: a ten percentage point increase in the international price for 
exported commodities increased per capita GDP by over 0.91 percentage points, significant at the 5 
percent level.  Note that drought in the first stage per capita GDP regression is insignificant.  
Columns (7) and (8) show however that drought does have a significantly negative effect on total 
GDP.3 
 
5.2 Population Size, Per Capita GDP, and Civil Conflict 
5.2.1 Civil Conflict Incidence 
In Table 3 I present estimates on the effect that population size exhibits on civil conflict incidence.  
In columns (1) and (2) I regress the civil conflict incidence indicator on a set of cross-sectional 
                                                 
3 The insignificance in the per capita GDP regression arises because drought has also a negative effect on population 
size.  The overall effect of drought on per capita income is therefore ambiguous because as population size declines 
more resources (capital and land) become available per worker.  
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control variables, the log of population size, and the log of (real) per capita GDP.4  The probit 
model of column (1) is estimated using maximum likelihood and reported coefficients are marginal 
effects evaluated at sample means.  It turns out that the only variable significant at conventional 
confidence levels is the log share of mountainous terrain.  Population size and per capita GDP are 
both insignificant.  Also cross-sectional differences in ethnic fractionalization, colonial origin, and 
political decentralization are not significantly associated with a higher or lower average incidence 
of civil conflict.  In column (2) exactly the same set of variables are included but the functional 
form is changed to a linear probability model.  Comparing these point estimates with the marginal 
effects of column (1) shows that the least squares and probit estimates yield coefficients that are 
both quantitatively and statistically quite similar.  Moreover, the only variable significant is a 
country's share of mountainous terrain. 
 The regressions in columns (1) and (2) need to be interpreted with care since there remain 
many difficult to measure variables related to cross-sectional differences in social fragmentation, 
institutional quality, or geographic conditions that have only been captured imperfectly by the set of 
included control variables.  Column (3) therefore implements country fixed effects to account for 
unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.  This has the implication that point estimates increase 
somewhat in absolute size.  Yet, statistically they remain insignificant at conventional confidence 
levels.   
 Column (4) estimates the effect that larger population size exhibits on civil conflict 
incidence by two-stage least squares (2SLS).  Using the drought dummy, rainfall, and the 
international commodity price index as excluded instruments, an IV estimate yields a highly 
significant coefficient on the population variable that is nearly ten times larger than the 
corresponding least squares estimate of column (3): a one percentage point increase in population 
                                                 
4 The sources of the cross-sectional variables are as follows: ethnic fractionalization, the share of mountainous terrain, 
and colonial origin are from Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004); primary school education is from WDI (2007); 
and political decentralization, measured by an indicator variable that is one if the country has a federal/semi-federal 
government, is from Polity III. 
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size increases the likelihood of civil conflict by over 1.2 percentage points (p-value 0.034).5  Per 
capita GDP enters this second stage with the correct sign, although insignificant at conventional 
confidence levels (p-value of 0.141).  In column (5) I include country trends and common year 
effects as additional control variables.6  This bears the result that the coefficient on country size 
becomes even larger: a one percentage point increase in the population raises the likelihood of civil 
conflict by as much as 6.6 percentage points.  Per capita GDP enters now as highly statistically 
significant (p-value 0.020): a positive shock in per capita GDP by one percentage points reduces 
civil conflict incidence by over 1.9 percentage points.    
 Column (6) shows that the negative relationship between per capita GDP and civil conflict is 
maintained when elevating the benchmark for coding an event as civil conflict to 1000 battle deaths 
per annum (civil war).  But this is not true for country population size.  In this case the estimated 
coefficient on the population variable is insignificant and quantitatively only about one-third of the 
size of the coefficient obtained in column (5).7   
 
4.2.2 Civil Conflict Onset.   
Since civil conflict incidence incorporates elements of conflict duration, one possible interpretation 
of the results in Table 3 is that larger country population size and lower per capita GDP increase the 
                                                 
5 A  Hausman test rejects similarity of the IV and least square estimate at over 95 percent confidence.  One of the 
reasons for this large difference between IV and least squares estimate is that civil conflict has a large negative 
effect on population size because of battle casualties, the spread of disease, and masses of refugee movements that 
set in even before warfare activity has fully escalated (Davenport, Moore, and Poe, 2003; Ghobarah, Huth and 
Russeth, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2007). A least squares estimate will therefore suffer from substantial 
downward bias.  Another reason for the quantitatively small coefficients obtained from the least squares regression   
is measurement error, which is presumably large in Sub-Saharan account statistics (Heston, 1994; Deaton, 2005).  
To the extend that this is classical, least squares estimates will be attenuated towards zero. 
6 The year fixed effects capture events such as the end of the Cold War, global business cycle, climate change, or a 
decline in the costs to trade.  The country time trends capture additional time series variation that is specific to each 
country. 
7 Note that by analyzing civil conflicts that incur more than 1000 battle deaths one systematical excludes those 
conflicts that may be minor for countries with large populations but potentially major for smaller African countries.  
To illustrate the implications, consider for instance Sierra Leone that had an average sample population size of 
around 4 million.  During the period 1981-2004 more than 41% of all observations were coded as civil conflict, but 
only 8% were coded as civil war.  On the other hand, for a large country like Sudan that had an average sample 
population size of over 28 million this coding difference mattered little as 92% of all observation were marked as 
civil conflict, and 83% percent were marked as civil war.  The choice of the battle death benchmark hence not only 
affects the coding of civil conflict across countries but also across time within countries.  Increasing the battle-death  
benchmark will therefore act as a selection mechanism that downward biases the estimate on the population variable 
as small countries rarely experience civil war.   
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likelihood of an already ongoing civil conflict.  Equally plausible, and from the policy perspective 
more interesting, is that increases in country population size increase the likelihood of an outbreak 
of new or recurrent civil conflict.   
 To explore this channel, Table 4 presents estimates where the dependent variable is a civil 
conflict onset indicator that takes on the value of one each time there is an outbreak of civil conflict.  
The first column reports the least squares estimates.  Just as in Table 3 these estimates are 
quantitatively small and statistically insignificant.  In column (2) population size and per capita 
GDP are instrumented by drought, smooth variations in rainfall, and the index of international 
commodity prices.  Now the effect of population size is quantitatively larger and statistically 
significant.  In column (3) I include in addition to the country fixed effects country specific time 
trends and year fixed effects.  An instrumental variable estimate yields that a one percentage point 
increase in population size raises the likelihood of a civil conflict onset by over 5.2 percentage 
points, significant at the 4 percent level.  Higher per capita GDP in turn significantly reduces this 
probability.   
 Columns (4) and (5) show that the impact of population size on civil conflict risk is 
particularly pronounced in countries that are characterized by above average levels in ethnic 
fragmentation, while in countries that have federal governments it is attenuated towards zero. This 
may be an indication that part of the reason why larger country population size -- conditional on per 
capita income levels -- significantly increased the risk of civil conflict because there was a greater 
demand by a sub-population for sovereignty (Sambanis, 2008; Spolaore, 2008; see also Alesina and 
Spolaore, 1997, 2003).  Columns (6) and (7) further explore this channel by distinguishing between 
those civil conflicts that arise because of incompatibilities over government and those civil conflicts 
that arise because of incompatibilities over territory.8  One would expect that if larger population 
size increases the risk of civil conflict because a sub-population, dissatisfied with public policies of 
                                                 
8 Recall that civil conflicts over government relate to incompatibilities concerning the type of political system, the 
replacement of the central government or the change of its composition, while conflicts over territory are 
incompatibilities concerning the status of the specified territory, e.g. secession or autonomy.  See here also the 
PRIO/UPSALLA web-site for further detail (www.pcr.uu.se). 
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the central government, demands greater self-determination over political decision-making at the 
sub-national level then there is a significant effect of population size on those conflicts that arise 
because of motives related to secession and autonomy.  Column (6) shows that this is indeed the 
case: a one percentage point increase in population size significantly increased the risk of civil 
conflict over incompatibilities arising from territorial autonomy by over 2.2 percentage points.  
Interestingly, for these secessionist conflicts, per capita GDP is insignificant.  Column (7) therefore 
shows that higher per capita GDP significantly reduced civil conflict onset on average because it 
was associated with less conflict arising from incompatibilities over government.  
 
5.3 Robustness 
5.3.1 Overidentification Tests 
Underlying the validity of the instrumental variable estimates is that drought, rainfall, and the 
international commodity price index have no effect on civil conflict other than through per capita 
GDP or population size.  At the bottom of Tables 3 and 4, I had provided evidence supporting this 
assumption by computing the p-values of the Hansen J-test that examines the hypothesis that 
instruments are jointly uncorrelated to the second stage error term.  Since none of these p-values are 
statistically significant, formal overidentification tests support the assumption that the employed 
instruments fulfill the exclusion restriction.   
 To show this also more intuitively, Table 5 adds one-by-one the drought dummy, the linear 
rainfall measure, and the index of international commodity prices as exogenous regressors.  The 
reduced form estimates in columns (1) and (5) yield that drought, conditional on rainfall and the 
international commodity price index, has a significantly negative effect on civil conflict.  If this is 
because of channels other than per capita income or population size, then one expects that drought 
enters as significantly negative in the second stage regression, where population size and per capita 
GDP are treated as endogenous regressors.  Columns (2) and (6) show that this is not the case  -- the 
coefficient on drought is positive, quantitatively small, and statistically insignificant.  The estimates 
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in columns (2) and (6) therefore support the assumption that drought only affects civil conflict 
through income or population size, and that otherwise, it is insignificant.   
 Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) repeat this exercise for the linear rainfall measure and the 
international commodity price index.  As can be readily seen, there is no evidence that these 
instruments affect civil conflict through channels other than per capita GDP or population size.  
Table 5 therefore echoes the results of the Hansen J-test that showed that instruments are 
uncorrelated to second stage error terms.  The assumption of instrument validity hence stands up 
quite comfortably against formal econometric analysis.    
 
5.3.2 Fuller Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Also essential for the instrumental variable regressions to yield consistent estimates is that 
instruments provide a sufficiently precise first stage fit.  Staiger and Stock (1997) suggested as a 
rule of thumb criteria a first stage F-stat of around 10, which for the population (per capita GDP) 
regression was 10.79 (8.75).  The Cragg-Donald statistic is however substantially lower (3.02), 
indicating that instruments may be weak (see Stock, Watson, and Yogo (2002)).  To address this I 
present second stage estimates using Fuller limited information maximum-likelihood estimators.  
These estimators have been shown to be more robust to weak instruments than two-stage least 
squares (e.g. Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002; Hahn and Hausman, 2003).  The two Fuller limited-
information maximum likelihood estimates are calculated for Fuller constants 4 and 1.  The Fuller 1 
estimator yields the most unbiased estimator and is recommended when one wants to test 
hypotheses; the Fuller 4 estimator minimizes the mean squared error of the estimator (Fuller, 1977).  
Table 6 shows that using either of these Fuller estimators produces estimates that are quite similar 
to the 2SLS estimates of Table 3 and 4.  In all cases is the effect of population size and per capita 
GDP quantitatively large and statistically significant.  
 
5.3.3 Alternative Drought Data  
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As an additional robustness check, I present in Table 7 instrumental variable estimates based on the 
use of alternative drought indicators.  In columns (1)-(3) second stage estimates are computed when 
extending the drought dummy to include also those instances where rainfall was in the lower 5%-
10% quantile.  In Panel A, where I control for country fixed effects, an IV estimate on the 
population variable yields a significantly positive effect with coefficients ranging from 1.244 to 
2.094 (the corresponding p-values are 0.003 and 0.081 respectively).  In Panel B, where in addition 
to the country fixed effects country specific time trends and year fixed effects are included, 
coefficients are very imprecisely estimated and are not statistically significant at conventional 
confidence levels (coefficients remain quantitatively quite large, ranging from 3.30 to 6.36).  In 
general, extending the cut-off much beyond the 5 percent quantile, say, to the 15 percent quantile, 
does not yield significant first nor second stage point estimates (regressions not shown).  This 
negative result should not surprise however given that it are severe and repeated droughts, rather 
than episodes of low rainfall that lead to the famines associated with mass migration, lower fertility, 
and higher mortality rates (Sen, 1981; Fafchamp, 2003; FAO, 2005; WHO, 2006).   
   An alternative to the rainfall based drought indicator is to use data on drought provided by 
the Universite Catholique de Louvain's International Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT, 
2008).9  In this database a drought is reported if any of the following minimum criteria are fulfilled: 
(i) ten or more people reported killed; (ii) hundred or more people affected; (iii) a declaration of a 
state of emergency; or (iv) a call for international assistance.   
 In columns (4)-(6) of Table 7 I compute second stage estimates that use instead of the 
rainfall based drought dummy the EM-DAT drought indicator as an instrumental variable.  I define 
the EM-DAT indicator in complete analogy to the rainfall based drought indicator, assigning it a 
value of one for the 5 percent harshest droughts (measured by number of people affected according 
to EM-DAT).  Columns (4)-(6) show that using the EM-DAT drought indicator as an instrument 
yields for population size significant second stage estimates with coefficients ranging between 1.17 
                                                 
9 The data is publicly available at www.emdat.be.  
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to 1.90 (the p-values are 0.005 and 0.085 respectively).  As a further robustness check, I combine 
EM-DAT drought data with the GPCP rainfall based drought indicator, generating a dummy 
variable that is one if both EM-DAT and GPCP jointly agree on the event of drought.  This yields 
somewhat smaller point estimates on the population variable (coefficients range between 1.56 and 
1.06), which are nevertheless significant at the 95 percent confidence level (see columns (7)-(9)). 
 It should be pointed out that for purposes of instrumental variable analysis the rainfall based 
drought indicator has at least three important advantages over the EM-DAT data.  First, rainfall 
based drought is interpretable as triggering famine, which in Sub-Saharan Africa reduces population 
size because of lower fertility, migration, and higher mortality rates.  Second, since rainfall is 
random the drought indicator is completely exogenous to the presence of Sub-Saharan civil conflict.  
This stands in stark contrast to the EM-DAT drought indicator, which is an outcome variable 
potentially endogenous to the conditions of the local environment.  Moreover, generating a drought 
indicator based on number of people affected may produce confounding effects because of cross-
country differences in the size and the trend of the population variable.  A rainfall based drought 
indicator is therefore preferable from the standpoint of instrumental variable analysis.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Testing the link between country population size and civil conflict risk requires an exogenous 
source of variation in population size.  I argued that drought induced variations in the population of 
Sub-Saharan countries satisfy this condition.  By exploiting the negative response of the Sub-
Saharan population to randomly occurring drought and constructing instrumental variable estimates 
that linked exogenously driven variation in population size to civil conflict risk, I addressed issues 
at the heart of identifying causal effects that arise in the presence of endogeneity bias and omitted 
variables.  I showed, that failure to address these biases may lead to the conclusion that population 
size had no significant effect on civil conflict risk.   
 Two main messages follow from the paper's empirical results: first, larger population size 
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places African states at a significantly higher risk of suffering from civil conflict -- smaller country 
size leads to more state stability -- and second, as nations become richer they will have less armed 
conflict.  The instrumental variable estimates showed that part of the reason why the Sub-Saharan 
region had suffered from civil conflict was because of rapid increases in country population size 
that triggered a wave of intra-state conflicts concerning incompatibilities over territorial autonomy.  
Adverse income shocks in turn threatened the stability of nation-states because they triggered civil 
conflict arising from incompatibilities over government.   
 It may be tempting to conclude from these results that partition may be a solution to African 
civil conflict.  This would be precipitous however for two main reasons.  First, partition will create 
asymmetric payoffs.  If losers are not compensated sufficiently, then what was fought as an intra-
state war may simply turn into an inter-state conflict between two new states.  Second, there are  
other alternatives available, such as birth control and migration policy, that correspond more closely 
to the mechanism identified in this paper to keep countries' population size in check.  A further 
strategy to be considered in the fight against civil conflicts is political and fiscal decentralization 
(see here for instance, Lake and Rothchild, 2005; or Sambanis, 2008).  This type of strategy would 
therefore accommodate increases in population size by decentralizing political and fiscal decision-
making, reducing conflict potential that arises from regional demands for greater self-determination 
over the allocation of resources and the drafting of social policy.   
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Table 1 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
        A. Measures of Civil Conflict 
 
 Mean  Std. Dev. Observations 
Civil Conflict Incidence > 25 Battle Deaths 0.267 0.443 888 
Civil Conflict Incidence >1000 Battle Deaths 0.123 0.328 888 
Civil Conflict Onset > 25 Battle Deaths 0.047 0.212 888 
Civil Conflict Onset >1000 Battle Deaths 0.023 0.148 888 
Conflict Onset over Secession / Autonomy 0.020 0.141 888 
Conflict Onset over Government 0.035 0.184 888 
   
        B. Population Size and Per Capita Income 
 
Total Population 15.854 1.150 888 
Population Aged 15-64 15.186 1.158 888 
Population Aged  0-14 15.040 1.159 888 
Male Population  15.138 1.153 888 
Number of Refugees  2.890 2.397 462 
Real Per Capita GDP 6.996 0.734 888 
 
        C. Instrumental Variables 
 
Rainfall (GPCP) 6.743 0.629 888 
Commodity Price Index 4.094 0.494 888 
Drought  (GPCP) 0.050 0.217 888 
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Table 2 
Drought, Population Size, and Per Capita Income 
 
                                           Population Size                                                            GDP            
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All Age 15-64 Age 0-14 Male Refugees GDP  
Per Capita 
GDP GDP 
Drought -0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.016***
(0.005) 
0.837* 
(0.451) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.036**
(0.15) 
Log Rainfall -0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.305 
(0.421) 
0.075** 
(0.029) 
0.070**
(0.033) 
 
Log Commodity Price 0.012 
(0.010) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.11) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.336 
(0.380) 
0.085** 
(0.041) 
0.098**
(0.047) 
0.099** 
(0.048) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects and Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Observations  888 888 888 888 462 888 888 888 
 
Note: Method of estimation is least squares.  Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are shown in the parentheses.   
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.  
 
Table 3 
Population Size,  Per Capita Income, and Civil Conflict Incidence 
 
                                                                                            Civil Conflict                                                         Civil War  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit LS LS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Log Population Size 0.022 
(0.042) 
0.009 
(0.037) 
0.145 
(0.144) 
1.208** 
(0.569) 
6.589* 
(3.901) 
2.354 
(2.424) 
Log Per Capita GDP -0.093 
(0.068) 
-0.064 
(0.057) 
-0.154 
(0.103) 
-1.178 
(0.800) 
-1.887** 
(0.812) 
-1.210** 
(0.586) 
Mountainous Terrain 0.078** 
(0.043) 
0.083** 
(0.042) 
    
British Colonial Origin -0.062 
(0.116) 
-0.043 
(0.107) 
    
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.101 
(0.247) 
0.087 
(0.263) 
    
Education -0.176 
(0.112) 
-0.186 
(0.121) 
    
Decentralization 0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.137) 
    
Overidentification . . . 0.2646 0.5371 0.8280 
Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects and Trends No No No No Yes Yes 
No Observations  888 888 888 888 888 888 
 
Note: Method of estimation in column (1) is maximum likelihood, with marginal effects evaluated at sample means; columns (2)-(3) least squares, 
and columns (4)-(6) two-stage least squares.  The excluded instruments in columns (4)-(6) are the drought indicator, the log level of rainfall, and the 
log level of the international commodity price index.  The Hansen J-test statistic on the overidentification restrictions is provided in form of p-values.  
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.  
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Table 4 
 Population Size,  Per Capita Income, and Civil Conflict Onset 
 
                    Civil Conflict                                Territory        Government 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 LS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Log Population Size -0.008 
(0.057) 
0.679* 
(0.385) 
5.189** 
(2.556) 
8.430** 
(3.782) 
8.543** 
(4.067) 
2.218* 
(1.290) 
3.014 
(2.121) 
Log Per Capita GDP 0.008 
(0.030) 
-0.870* 
(0.535) 
-1.325** 
(0.575) 
-0.768 
(0.794) 
-1.958* 
(1.041) 
-0.180 
(0.312) 
-1.573*** 
(0.578) 
Log Population Size*  
Ethnic Homogeneity  
   -2.420 
(5.578) 
   
Log Per Capita GDP* 
Ethnic Homogeneity  
   -1.072 
(1.804) 
   
Log Population Size* 
Decentralization 
    -4.971 
(4.163) 
  
Log Per Capita GDP* 
Decentralization 
    1.915 
(1.633) 
  
Overidentification . 0.6069 0.4111 0.4889 0.5748 0.7626 0.8133 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects and Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Observations  888 888 888 888 888 888 888 
 
Note: Method of estimation in column (1) is least squares, columns (2)-(7) two-stage least squares.  The dependent variable in columns (1)-(5) is civil 
conflict onset that arises either because of an incompatibility concerning territory or an incompatibility concerning government.  In columns (6) 
(column (7)) the dependent variable is a civil conflict onset that arises because of incompatibilities concerning territory (government).  The excluded 
instruments in columns (2)-(7) are the drought indicator, the log level of rainfall, and the log level of the international commodity price index.  The 
Hansen J-test statistic on the overidentification restrictions is provided in form of p-values.  Ethnic Homogeneity is an indicator function that is one if 
ethnic fractionalization is below the cross-sectional average and zero otherwise.  Decentralization is an indicator function that is one for federal/semi-
federal states and zero for unitary states.  Both the interaction terms on the population variable (columns (4) and (5)) are jointly significant at the 6% 
level.  Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are shown in the parentheses.  *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.  
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Table 5 
 Population Size, Per Capita Income, and Civil Conflict 
 
                                                               Civil Conflict Incidence                                      Civil Conflict Onset            
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LS 2SLS 2SLS 
 
2SLS 
 
LS 2SLS 2SLS 
 
2SLS 
 
Drought -0.090* 
(0.051) 
0.070 
(0.134) 
  -0.070***
(0.026) 
0.061 
(0.095) 
  
Log Rainfall -0.220** 
(0.091) 
 -0.077 
(0.115) 
 -0.164***
(0.052) 
 -0.067 
(0.073) 
 
Log Commodity Price  -0.051 
(0.070) 
  0.085 
(0.147) 
-0.025 
(0.047) 
  0.074 
(0.097) 
Log Population Size  10.354 
(9.196) 
5.804 
(3.625) 
5.870 
(3.988) 
 8.457 
(6.600) 
4.506** 
(2.243) 
4.564* 
(2.609) 
Log Per Capita GDP  -2.115**
(1.036) 
-1.450 
(1.024) 
-2.456** 
(1.262) 
 -1.523* 
(0.784) 
-0.947 
(0.657) 
-1.821** 
(0.895) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects and Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Observations  888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 
 
Note: Method of estimation in columns (1) and (5) is least squares; columns (2)-(4) and (5)-(6) two-stage least squares.  The instrument are the 
drought indicator, the log level of rainfall, and the log level of the international commodity price index.  Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors are provided in the parentheses.  *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 
99 percent confidence.  
 
 
 
Table 6 
 Population Size,  Per Capita Income, and Civil Conflict 
 
                     Conflict Incidence                                           Conflict Onset                
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Fuller 1 Fuller 4 Fuller 1 Fuller 4 Fuller 1 Fuller 4 Fuller 1 Fuller 4 
Log Population Size 1.227** 
(0.564) 
1.007*** 
(0.384) 
6.062* 
(3.591) 
4.185* 
(2.488) 
0.617** 
(0.317) 
0.463** 
(0.219) 
4.887** 
(2.367) 
3.460** 
(1.581) 
Log Per Capita GDP -1.205 
(0.798) 
-0.884* 
(0.500) 
-1.788** 
(0.726) 
-1.417** 
(0.556) 
-0.776* 
(0.436) 
-0.544** 
(0.278) 
-1.270** 
(0.538) 
-0.997** 
(0.411) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects and Trends No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
No Observations  888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 
 
Note: Method of estimation is the Fuller limited information maximum likelihood estimator.  The excluded instruments are the drought indicator 
variable, the log level of rainfall, and the log level of the international commodity price index.  Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are provided in the parentheses.  *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent 
confidence.  
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Table 7 
 Country Size,  Per Capita Income, and Civil Conflict 
 
      10% Drought Shock                   EM-DAT Drought                   EM-DAT & 5% Joint 
 
                           Panel A: Country Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 2SLS Fuller 1 Fuller 4 2SLS Fuller 1 Fuller 4 2SLS Fuller 1 Fuller 4 
Log Population Size 2.094* 
(1.200) 
1.738** 
(0.801) 
1.244***
(0.413) 
1.898* 
(1.101)
1.639**
(0.805) 
1.172***
(0.418) 
1.558* 
(0.807) 
1.454** 
(0.701) 
1.107***
(0.390) 
Log Per Capita GDP -2.420 
(1.719) 
-1.899* 
(1.119) 
-1.185**
(0.517) 
-2.104 
(1.423)
-1.755 
(1.021) 
-1.131** 
(0.437) 
-1.659 
(1.114) 
-1.510 
(0.956) 
-0.963** 
(0.476) 
Overidentification 0.8115 0.8116 0.8116 0.6740 0.6637 0.6637 0.3348 0.4343 0.4343 
No Observations  888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 
                           Panel B: Country Fixed Effects + Time Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 2SLS Fuller 1 Fuller 4 2SLS Fuller 1 Fuller 4 2SLS Fuller 1 Fuller 4 
Log Population Size 6.357 
(5.140) 
5.655 
(4.532) 
3.295 
(2.750) 
8.401 
(9.440)
5.224 
(5.568) 
1.390 
(2.256) 
6.167 
(8.828) 
3.980 
(5.856) 
0.336 
(2.241) 
Log Per Capita GDP -1.862** 
(-0.849) 
-1.749** 
(0.774) 
-1.336**
(0.553) 
-2.047*
(1.137)
-1.680**
(0.750) 
-1.160** 
(0.465) 
-1.901* 
(1.127) 
-1.622** 
(0.791) 
-1.080** 
(0.450) 
Overidentification 0.4813 0.4746 0.4746 0.4614 0.5016 0.6183 0.3477 0.4589 0.4589 
No Observations  888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 
 
Note: Method of estimation in columns (1), (4), and (7) is two-stage least squares; in columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (9) Fuller limited information  
maximum likelihood.  The excluded instruments are the drought indicator variable, the log level of rainfall, and the log level of the international 
commodity price index.  Control variables in Panel A are country fixed effects.  Panel B includes in addition to the country fixed effects country 
specific time trends and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are provided in parentheses.  The Hansen J overidentification test is provided for all 
second stage regressions in form of p-values.  *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent 
confidence.  
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Appendix Table  
List of Sub-Saharan Drought (1980-2004) 
 
Country Period of Rainfall 
Shortage 
Number of People Affected (EM-DAT, 2008) 
 
Angola  1991-1992 1,900,000 
Botswana  1989-1990 100,000 
Botswana  2001-2003 - 
Chad  1990-1991 300,000  
Ethiopia  1983-1984 7,750,000 
Gambia  1982-1983 400,000 
Gambia  1989-1990 - 
Guinea  1982-1983 * 
Kenya  1983-1984 600,000 
Kenya 1989-1999 1,600,000 
Kenya  1999-2000 21,000,000 
Malawi  1986-1987 1,430,000 
Mali  1995-1996 - 
Mauritania  1982-1983 1,600,000 
Mauritania  1990-1992 - 
Mauritania 1995-1996 447,000 
Mozambique  1985-1986 4,750,000  
Niger  1987-1988 1,000,000 
Niger 1990-1991 1,630,000 
Niger  1997-1998 8,500 
Senegal 1983-1984 1,200,000 
Senegal 1990-1991 - 
Somalia  1980-1985 500,000 
Somalia  1990-1991 - 
Somalia  1999-2000 2,000,000 
South Africa  1989-1990 1,320,000 
South Africa  2003-2004 15,000,000 
Sudan  1998-1999 - 
Swaziland 1985-1986 * 
Swaziland 1991-1992 200,000 
Swaziland  2001-2003 970,000 
Uganda  1983-1984 - 
Zimbabwe  1982-1983 700,000 
Zimbabwe  1991-1992 5,000,000 
Zimbabwe  2001-2003 6,000,000 
 
Note: The listed droughts are based on an indicator function that is one for the 5% largest drops in the level of rainfall over two consecutive years. 
Column (3) provides an estimate of the number of people affected according to EM-DAT (2008).  A dash implies that  EM-DAT did not list the event 
as drought; an asterix means that EM-DAT coded the event as drought without giving an estimate of the number of people affected.     
